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Serving in the Master’s House: Legal Protection
for In-Home Care Workers in the United States
Richard Michael Fischl∗
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Labor stories. – 3. The emerging law of in-home care work:
Three initiatives. – 4. Evaluating the initiatives. – 5. References. – Appendices.

1. Introduction
This essay will focus on the developing forms of legal protection available in the
United States to those whose principal place of work is another person’s home and
who are paid to do what is broadly referred to as “care work.” 1 The particular
services vary widely – from housecleaning, to child care, to companionship and
routine health care management for the elderly and the infirm – but the labor
market demographics do not: This is low-wage/no-benefit work performed almost
exclusively by women and primarily by women of color and of extra-national origin
(Blackett, 2011; Boris, Klein, 2015; Markkanen, Quinn, Sama, 2015).

* The author wishes to thank participants in the Thirteenth International Conference in
Commemoration of Marco Biagi for their thoughtful and encouraging reactions to an early
draft; Jon Bauer, Bethany Berger, John Cogan, Miguel de Figueiredo, Peter Kochenburger,
Molly Land, Tom Morawetz, Sachin Pandya, and Steve Utz for criticisms and suggestions
offered during an enormously helpful faculty workshop; Renee Gerni and Jennifer Hunter for
much-needed assistance in understanding the “view from the ground” in care worker
organizing and representation efforts; and Mairead O’Reilly (Class of 2016) and Reference
Librarian Extraordinaire Anne Rajotte for first-rate research.
1
For a perceptive explication of what counts as “care work” in in-home as well as
institutionalized settings, see Duffy, Armenia, Stacey (2015).
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At first blush, this may seem like an odd topic for a collection devoted, in the
words of the original call for papers, to “the transformation of the enterprise in
the global economy” and to phenomena such as “geographically extensive value
chains” and the emancipation of the firm “from any commitment to a particular
location.” But I am struck by the relevance of the developments under
consideration – italicized below and once again quoting the call for papers – to
the challenges that have long been faced by those engaged in the necessarily local
and profoundly personal provision of in-home care work in the US:
•
The “evolution of the organisational framework” of the enterprise: The
“outsourcing” of care work has deep roots in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries – when families of means commonly employed
domestic servants – but during the past fifty years the phenomenon
has increasingly become a feature of life in the middle class, the
working class, and among the poor, as the provision of caring services
has shifted dramatically from the family to a mix of market alternatives
(where family resources permit) and state supported services (where
they do not) (Duffy, 2015).
•
The “problems arising from the identification of the employer in
relations between a plurality of actors” and the resulting “need to
define the legal position of the actors involved in this plurality of
relations”: In the in-home care context, the players include individual
workers; organizations that represent them (principally labor unions
and worker centers) as well as those representing various cohorts of
care recipients (e.g., AARP for the beneficiaries of elder care);
private third-party placement firms; and state and national
governments, which fund and to a lesser extent otherwise regulate
much of this work (Boris and Klein, 2015). In the context of this
“plurality of actors,” an emerging issue of central importance is the
identity of the “employer” when the state pays the tab but the
immediate beneficiary of services “hires” and directs the work
performance of the individual provider.
•
The “assimilation between small business owners and self-employed
workers” facing “asymmetrical power relationships” and a “lack of
protective measures”: Here too there is an important analog from inhome care work and particularly in the context of family child care,
where services are frequently provided by individuals and small
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enterprises treated as independent contractors and thus beyond the
protective scope of most US labor and employment law.
•
The “fragmentary” legal and institutional responses to the challenges
faced by such workers via hard law (e.g., the application of wage and
hour law to domestic workers), soft law (e.g., union– and statemaintained registries for matching the would-be beneficiaries of care
with qualified and trained home care providers), and no law at all (or
so it almost invariably seems at the common law baseline).
In sum, “[h]ome care’s past prefigured the future[,]” anticipating by decades
many of the legal challenges faced by workers in the so-called “new economy”
(Boris, Klein, 2015, 15).
There is a further important link between in-home care work and the topics
addressed in this collection. The economic and organizational trends under
examination – the continued dismantling of internal labor markets, the relentless
outsourcing of services (via labor contractors) and production lines (via supply
chains), and the nigh giddy erasure of the local – conspire to create a world of
precarious employment and variable work-scheduling practices in which it is
increasingly difficult, economically as well as logistically, for a family to “care for
its own.” These developments thus account for much of the recent dramatic
growth in the in-home care work industry (Boris, Klein, 2015), which growth in
turn makes it possible for those with significant caring responsibilities – a labor
market cohort still quite nearly as gendered as that of the outsourced version – to
participate in the brave new world of work.
The essay proceeds thus. In Part I, I explore the historical exclusion of inhome care workers from legal protection with a pair of labor stories. The first is
an account of the role of “domestic servants” in the development of the common
law of employment and the eventual though decidedly partial displacement of
common law by statute. In the beginning confined to persons quite literally
engaged in the provision of “domestic” (i.e., household) services, during the late
nineteenth century the category became the default status for those working the
underside of the then-emerging employment relation – not for nothing was it
called master/servant law – and in that form defined those entitled to protection
under modern labor and employment legislation. Yet in a twist that continues to
complicate their plight, the “pioneers” in the field of abject personal service were
left behind in the legislative reform efforts of the twentieth Century, though,
contrary to what has become the conventional wisdom, their exclusion from those
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efforts began not with the New Deal but decades earlier as states enacted the first
generation of workers compensation laws.
The second story is an account drawn from my own experience as a labor
lawyer litigating cases about the legal rights of confidential secretaries – a class of
workers whose responsibilities are in a variety of ways the white-collar analog to
what domestic workers do in the home – an experience that offers a telling
glimpse into the values and assumptions that animate the resistance to legal
protection for both groups to this day.
Part II turns to contemporary efforts in the US to improve the legal lot of
those who provide in-home care work, exploring initiatives at both state and
federal levels to extend wage-and-hour protection to live-in domestic workers as
well as to providers of companionship services for the elderly and the disabled; to
protect the interests of in-home workers engaged in the provision of a wide
variety of care services via the state-by-state enactment of a “Bill of Rights for
Domestic Workers”; and to designate in-home care workers whose compensation
is provided by public funding as “employees” of the state – or of a state-created
institutional proxy – for purposes of collective bargaining over wages and other
salient issues, notwithstanding the fact that some key incidents of traditional
employer prerogative (e.g., hiring, firing, and directing the provision of services)
are exercised primarily by the beneficiaries of care or their families.
Part III examines the promise and perils of the respective initiatives. The
model of “constructing” an employment relationship for collective bargaining
purposes seems particularly well-suited (again in the words of the call for papers)
for “counter[ing] the trend towards the individualization of interests and the
decline in solidarity among workers,” while the wage-and-hour and “bill of
rights” initiatives present the same enforcement difficulties faced by most
individual-rights regimes and especially those providing protections for low-wage
workers. Yet on closer examination, these individual-rights initiatives likewise
reveal a critical solidaristic dimension in the campaigns to enact them as well as
efforts to secure their enforcement, as labor unions and worker centers deploy
rights-based innovations to organize and otherwise advance the interests of inhome care workers. At the same time, success on the collective-bargaining front is
threatened by a pattern of retrenchment at the state level and also by a recent
Supreme Court decision that just could not find its way past understandings of
the employment relation traceable to nineteenth-century master-servant law.
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2. Labor stories
2.1.

Another look at the legal history of “domestic servants”

Unlike the poor, the modern conception of the employment relation has not
always been with us. Well into the nineteenth century, American jurists
understood and organized the world of work in much the same way they
organized the rest of what we think of today as “contract law” – i.e., as discrete
bodies of legal doctrine governing the respective “relations between landlord and
tenant, guardian and ward, master and servant, and also relations of factors,
brokers, corporations, and so on, in a manner analogous to the way they had been
treated by Blackstone” (Orren, 1991, 61-62; Gilmore, 1974). According to the
conventional wisdom, a central feature of US legal development during the latter
part of the century was the shift “from status to contract” – i.e., the shedding of
such feudal remnants in favor of a regime in which the parties to all manner of
relationships freely and mutually constructed their terms of engagement in the
shadow of a unified body of largely facilitative contract law.
Whatever historical truth this narrative might hold in other contexts, the
recent work of legal historian Christopher Tomlins has persuasively made the case
that the story was otherwise for the American working class in the late nineteenth
century – that during this era “‘employees’become ‘servants,’ not vice versa”
(Tomlins, 2011, 355-56) and the wide variety of work relationships previously
governed by a potpourri of discrete regimes were absorbed into a single jural
category, “master and servant,” a category reserved in the earlier period for use in
the context of household service (Tomlins, 1993). Tomlins argues that the
conventional “status to contract” narrative has obscured this latter development
and that “by concentrating upon the loosening of the bonds of explicit servitude
– apprenticeship, indentured servitude, and eventually slavery – we have ignored
the changes, the tightenings, in the social and legal meaning of employment” that
occurred during this era as well (Tomlins, 2011, 356). In keeping with its roots in
domestic service, the master-servant relationship that emerged as the default
status for all forms of employment “had a necessary authoritarian component
distinguishing [it] from other kinds of contracts: The employer was entitled not
only to receipt of the services contracted for in their entirety prior to payment but
also to the obedience of the employee in the process of rendering them”
(Tomlins, 1993, 279-80; Orren, 1991). In other words, employees – working in a
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wide variety of institutional settings – were the new servants, domesticated, if not
domestic, since they “gave at the office” (or, more often, the factory, mill, mine,
shipyard, or farm) instead of in the master’s house.
At least in broad outline, the conventional wisdom has the next chapter in the
story right – i.e., the partial displacement of master/servant law by a flurry of
labor and employment legislation enacted during the twentieth century. But there
is a profoundly ironic twist rendered visible by the light Tomlins sheds on the
provenance of the common law baseline: In statute after reformist statute, the
workers whose legal status had come to define the employment relation – and
thus the boundaries of what the legislative flurry sought to reform – were left
outside the protective sweep of the emerging body of law. Existing histories of
how domestic servants came to find themselves on the cutting room floor, written
without the benefit of the insights offered by Tomlins, miss this dimension of the
story entirely.
Because of their focus on the key federal statutes of the New Deal era – the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Social
Security Act – those histories miss a second dimension of the domestic servant
saga as well. To be sure, they rightly note that the express exclusion of domestic
servants from each of those statutes went hand-in-hand with an exclusion for
agricultural workers and that the two occupational cohorts had several telling
characteristics in common. For one thing, in the New Deal era there were doubts
as to whether the federal power to regulate “interstate commerce” could reach
workers involved in the provision of such intensely local services as household
and farm work, and the exclusions may thus have been driven in some measure by
the drafters’desire to ensure that the legislation would survive constitutional
review. Regional economic interests may have also played a role, given the
centrality of low-wage agricultural and domestic work to the Southern economy
and the prominence of representatives from the region in the New Deal
congressional coalition. The accommodation of an uglier but related regional
interest loomed large as well, for in the 1930s the excluded occupational cohorts
were the source of employment for nearly two-thirds of African-American
workers. 2 Although the matter is not without controversy (DeWitt, 2010; Leroy,
2
In 1930, 36.1% of African-Americans were employed in agriculture and 28.6% were
employed in domestic and personal service. United States Department of Commerce 1930,
Statistical abstract of the United States, Washington, 75 tab. 2.
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Hicks, 1999; Linder, 1987) – and virtually all concerned acknowledge the
surprising paucity of reference to, let alone controversy about, the subject
exclusions in the legislative history of these statutes – an unholy trinity of
constitutional caution, regional economic interest, and Southern racial
domination has thus become the standard account of how domestic servants and
farmworkers found themselves on the outside looking in during the New Deal era
(DeWitt, 2010; Palmer, 1995; Perea, 2011).
Yet none of the existing histories acknowledge a pattern of exclusionary
practice that pre-dates the New Deal legislation by a quarter century and is
difficult to attribute to the historical forces associated with the standard account.
Thus, between 1910 and 1920, forty-three of what were then forty-eight states
enacted workers’compensation (WC) statutes, requiring or enabling employers
within their jurisdictions to insure their employees against workplace injuries and
occupational disease. 3 As it happens, all but six of those states excluded domestic
servants from statutory coverage. 4 Although some jurisdictions did so by negative
implication – typically, by limiting statutory protection to a specific list of
hazardous occupations that did not include domestic service – most states defined
WC coverage more broadly and expressly excluded domestic servants. 5 Like the
3
See Appendix I: State-by-State Treatment of Domestic and Agricultural Workers Under
Workers Compensation Laws, infra. By 1935, three of the five hold-out states had adopted
WC statutes (North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida), and the remaining two enacted
statutes in 1939 (Arkansas) and 1948 (Mississippi). See id. (The US did not have 50 states until
1959, when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the union.)
4
The statutes adopted by New Jersey, Maryland, Iowa, and Pennsylvania seemingly
covered domestic servants. The statutes adopted by Ohio and Connecticut had no specific
exclusion for domestic servants but governed only those employers with five or more
employees, thus excluding domestic servants working in most US households. The other 37
states excluded all domestic servants from statutory coverage. (Appendix 1.)
5
Twenty-three states enacted statutes with express exclusions for domestic workers, and 14
states did so by negative implication (Appendix I, note 1). New York – which enacted the first
WC statute in the country in 1910 and played a leading role in the development of WC
principles in the US (Witt 2004) – provided a template for both approaches. In the 1910
statute, New York took the negative implication approach and provided coverage for a list of
specific jobs (e.g., bridge building and demolition, scaffolding work) “determined to be
especially dangerous, in which from the nature, conditions or means of prosecution of the
work therein, extraordinary risks to the life and limb of workmen engaged therein are inherent,
necessary or substantially unavoidable ...,” and domestic servants were not on that list (1910
N.Y. Laws 1945 § 215). Most of the states enacting statutes at the beginning of the decade
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New Deal statutes enacted two decades later, virtually all of the jurisdictions
excluding domestic workers excluded agricultural laborers as well. 6 Significantly
for our purposes, the “early adopters” – of WC generally and of the exclusions
for domestic and farm workers in particular – were northern and western states,
and the holdouts, which did not enact WC until a decade or two later, were all
from the deep South. 7
The nigh uniform exclusion of the familiar occupational cohorts from the
emerging body of WC law could not plausibly have been a product of
constitutional caution (since these developments took place at the state level,
where concerns about the reach of the federal commerce power would not have
come into play) or of a triumph of Southern economic and racial policies (since
the practices in question originated in northern and western states and spread to
the South). Rather, the state-level exclusionary practices seem far more likely to
have been driven by the contemporaneous understanding of the problems the
WC statutes were designed to address – i.e., the dramatically increasing incidence
of death and injury flowing from industrial accidents and the barriers to recovery
for same posed by late nineteenth-century tort law (such as the negligence
standard and the fellow-servant rule) (Witt, 2004). The factory – rather than the
home or the farm – was thus the original focus of the remedial efforts, and it is
not a surprise that classes of workers not exposed to the hazards of industrial
production found themselves on the outside of reformist efforts.
Yet the WC developments also suggest that it is a mistake to treat the forces
driving the respective exclusions for domestic servants and agricultural workers as
historically linked in every respect. On the agriculture side, for example, there is
took a similar approach, excluding domestics by negative implication (Appendix I). In 1913,
New York amended its statute and “flipped the default,” broadly defining prima facie WC
coverage and providing specific exclusions, domestic servants among them (1913 N.Y. Laws
2277). The overwhelming majority of states that adopted WC laws after 1913 adopted this
latter approach (Appendix I).
6
Except in the cases of Vermont and Delaware – where the WC statutes contained express
exclusions for domestic servants but no exclusion for agricultural workers – every other state
treated agricultural workers in the same manner as domestic servants, excluding both cohorts
(either expressly or by negative implication) or including both (Appendix I, note 2).
7
See Appendix I and note 3, supra; see also Witt 2004, p. 18 (“southern states tended to be
laggards in the development of work-accident law reform, following paths charted by northern
states”).
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evidence of organized opposition by farm interests to the inclusion of their
workers in state WC schemes (Fishback, Kantor, 2000, 108), while there is no
evidence of a similar effort among the employers of domestic servants. At the
same time, John Fabian Witt’s magnificent study of the history of WC reveals the
deeply patriarchal nature of the ideological lenses through which late nineteenth–
and early twentieth-century lawmakers viewed the problem of industrial accidents
and may thus suggest an independent basis for the treatment of domestic
servants. As Witt observes, “[t]he central preoccupation of those who sought to
address the industrial-accident crisis was injury to the male wage earner with a
dependent wife and children[,]” and “this model of the family—the so-called
family wage—played an influential role in the development of the American law
of accidents” (Witt 2004, 19-20). The statutes in question were, after all, originally
denominated “workmen’s” or “workingmen’s” compensation laws, and the
“gender specificity [was] no coincidence” (Witt 2004, 20). To take but one telling
example, under the express terms of the New York WC statute, which became a
model in this respect and many others for a majority of the “early adopters” of
WC, recovery for the death of a worker was available for a dependent “widow or
next of kin,” and – as interpreted by the courts – “widowers were neither next of
kin nor widows” and thus not entitled to statutory compensation for the death of
a working wife (pp. 132-33). The erasure of working women that otherwise
characterizes so much of this body of law would go a long way to explain why
women’s work would likewise find itself on the cutting room floor, and make no
mistake about the gendered nature of contemporaneous domestic service, since
the workforce in question was overwhelmingly female and the work was by some
distance the most common source of paid employment for American women. 8
There is neither the time nor the space here to undertake anything like a
complete history of these developments and their implications for what I have
referred to as the standard account of the domestic servant and agricultural
8
According to the 1930 US Census figures, women comprised 82% of those classified as
“servants,” including both “cooks” and “other servants,” employed in domestic rather than
institutional settings (such as hotels and boarding houses). United States Department of
Commerce 1930, tab. 49 (reporting that women comprised 371,095 out of 565,392 total cooks
and 1,263,864 out of 1,433,741 total other servants). Moreover, nearly 30% of “gainful[ly]”
employed women worked in “domestic and personal service,” half again as many as those who
worked in either manufacturing or clerical jobs and twice as many as those who worked in
professional positions, principally teachers and nurses. Id. at 55 tab. 48, 63 tab. 49.
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worker exclusions, but two additional observations are in order. First, my focus
on gender in the genesis of the exclusion for domestics should not be read to
preclude the operation of a racial dimension as well. The racial politics of the
New Deal are well documented, and, as noted earlier, together the domestic and
farm labor exclusions covered nearly two-thirds of African-Americans in paid
employment in the US, a devastating racial impact difficult to ascribe to mere
oversight. While the “too much collateral damage” argument raised by some to
challenge the racial domination narrative – i.e., the claim that race could not have
been a factor since the majority of US workers adversely impacted by the
domestic and farm labor exclusions were white (DeWitt, 2010) – may have some
force in the context of agriculture (where over 70% of the workers were indeed
native whites), the argument is less convincing in the context of domestics (where
native whites made up just over a third of the workforce, nearly half were AfricanAmerican, and most of the rest were foreign born). 9
The case for a racial dimension in the development of WC is more difficult to
make, since there were few African-Americans in the early adopting states before
the first wave of northern migration coinciding with World War I (Witt, 2004).
Yet the story offered thus far may well help to account for the “dog that did not
bark” in the legislative history of the New Deal statutes. Thus, against the
backdrop of a longstanding and widespread state-level practice of excluding
domestic and farm labor from the protections of workplace regulation, adopting
the same exclusions in the New Deal context might well have appeared to
representatives from even the most progressive and otherwise worker friendly
northern states to be unremarkable and merely business as usual. 10 It would not
9
Among domestic servants in 1930, 555,761 (36%) were native white; 264,167 (17%) were
foreign-born white; 714,630 (46%) were African-American; and 27,224 (2%) were “other,” a
classification that included “Mexicans, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Hindus, Koreans,
Hawaiians, etc.” United States Department of Commerce 1930, 85 tab. 3 (combined figures
under “Domestic and personal service—Servants” for “Cooks” and “Other servants” apart
from those working in “Hotels, restaurants, boarding houses, etc.”). For the corresponding
figures in agriculture, see id. at 75 tab. 2.
10
Buttressing this inference is the fact that a similar developmental pattern is evident
among the states that took the lead in enacting unemployment insurance statutes and did so
before the scheme was “federalized” by the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935.
Following the approach taken by Wisconsin, which passed the nation’s first unemployment
insurance act in 1931, a majority of those states likewise adopted express domestic servant and
agricultural worker exclusions, and once again the exclusionary pattern had its genesis in
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have been the first time, nor was it to be the last, that a failure to “remember the
ladies” would be business as usual for American lawmakers.
2.2. Confidential secretaries, in-home care work, and the gender connection

For a half decade between law school and law teaching, I worked as an
appellate lawyer for the National Labor Relations Board, and most of my cases
involved efforts by the agency to secure reinstatement and backpay for employees
fired for union organizing and (in the language of the National Labor Relations
Act) “other concerted activities for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection.” 11
In what eventually became my “career” case – in the sense that it was with me
from my first day on the job until the day I departed, as well as in the sense that I
have been writing about the case ever since I joined the academy – the general
manager of an electric power company in rural Indiana fired his long-time
personal secretary because she had signed a petition protesting the dismissal of a
fellow employee who suffered the loss of an arm as a result an on-the-job injury. 12
There was no serious question that the signing of the petition by the secretary and
most of the firm’s other employees was “concerted activity for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection” nor that the manager had fired her because of her role
in the protest; indeed, her signature was prominently displayed John Hancockstyle among the names immediately following the text of the petition, and her
boss abruptly dismissed her the first opportunity he had after receiving the
offending document. But a complication lay in the firm’s claim that she was a
“confidential employee” outside the scope of statutory protection because of her
service as personal secretary to the firm’s general manager.
The details of the treatment of confidential employees under the Labor Act
need not detain us; in a nutshell, employees who provide confidential assistance
to management officials in the exercise of labor relations responsibilities are
deemed ineligible for inclusion in a bargaining unit of other employees and are
arguably excluded altogether from the Act’s protection. Ordinarily, the personal
secretary to a firm’s general manager would easily fit that definition, but the
northern and western states. (Appendix II: Unemployment Insurance Statutes Enacted before
Enactment of Social Security Act of 1935 (8/14/35), infra).
11
29 U.S.C. § 157.
12
NLRB v. Hendricks County REMC, 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
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record in the case revealed that the manager in question had handled the firm’s
labor relations matters with the assistance of outside counsel and did not share
the correspondence, working documents, and the like with his secretary, keeping
the pertinent materials in a locked file behind his desk. As the Labor Board and
the reviewing courts noted, this was an unusual arrangement, but the small-town
rural context as well as the fierce sense of solidarity among the firm’s employees
evident in the offending petition may well have prompted the manager to avoid
sharing the firm’s labor relations plans and strategies with an employee who was
otherwise by all accounts a most capable and efficient personal assistant.
Three months out of law school, the case seemed like a slam-dunk to me, for
the facts were not seriously in dispute, and the equities strongly favored an
employee heartlessly fired for taking a courageous but respectful stand to defend
a disabled colleague. The firm’s only plausible argument was that employees with
access to confidential information of any kind – not just confidential labor matters
– should be treated as “confidential employees,” and there was dictum in a thenrecent Supreme Court opinion supporting that view. Yet such an expansion
would have upended four decades of labor law and abruptly denied collective
bargaining rights to all manner of professional and other white-collar workers –
and to many blue– and pink-collar workers whose tasks made them privy to
employer secrets – so the policy calculus seemed strongly in our favor as well.
Nevertheless, the grown-ups at the agency were deeply concerned about our
prospects, and when I pressed them to explain the source of their doubts, the best
anyone could do was to proclaim that the personal secretary to a firm’s general
manager just had to be a confidential employee, and no amount of conscientious
fact-finding and careful parsing of the applicable legal test could avoid what they
saw as this basic and undeniable truth.
As was so often the case in those early days of practice, the grown-ups were
right, for I managed to lose the case not once but twice in the federal court of
appeals before the slimmest of Supreme Court majorities came to the rescue of
the courageous secretary. The oral arguments at the appellate level were
excruciating exercises, with judge after judge pressing various versions of the
point that the general manager’s personal secretary just had to be a confidential
employee and dismissing my best efforts to demonstrate that, on this record, this
manager had carefully kept this secretary out of this loop when it came to labor
matters. I am slow but not stupid and thus began to sense that something more
was going on here, and the big reveal came at the moment a kindly senior judge
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on one of the panels interrupted my presentation to ask, “Counsel, don’t you see
that union rights are awfully hard to swallow when you’re talking about
someone’s personal secretary? It would be like . . . like union rights for your
wife!”
At the time, I had neither a personal secretary nor a wife, and, though I adored
and greatly admired my father, it occurred to me that there was no person on
earth who might benefit more from union representation than my mother, who
raised six children and ran a household without a net or, for that matter, a
domestic servant. Why then, I wanted to ask, were legal rights for either wives or
personal secretaries so unthinkable? Yet I had been permitted a glimpse of what I
came eventually to think of as the hidden topography of American labor law – the
values and assumptions, in James Atleson’s elegant phrasing, that run so deep in
legal decision making they scarcely need explaining let alone defending (Atleson,
1983). And what were the values and assumptions I had encountered among my
senior colleagues at the NLRB and so many of the federal judges who heard the
secretary’s case? Simply this: that the power and prerogatives of the beneficiary of
intimate services were of greater moment than the needs and interests of the
provider, and that the loyal provision of such services was incompatible with the
notion of countervailing rights or the law’s intrusion. It is no coincidence that the
work in question was women’s work, and if the confidential secretary was the
proxy wife in the workplace, then the domestic servant is very much the proxy
wife in the home. Once you understand that, the rest of the way US law has
traditionally treated in-home care work begins to make sense.
3. The emerging law of in-home care work: Three initiatives
In the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a second wave of workplace
legislation, including the key antidiscrimination laws associated with the Civil
Rights era (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967) as well as “minimum standards” regulation such as the
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OHSA). Yet domestic servants once
again found themselves on the outside of reformist efforts, expressly excluded
from OSHA coverage and gaining little traction on the antidiscrimination front,
since the statutes in question establish jurisdictional thresholds (e.g., Title VII
governs employers with 15 or more employees) the staff at Downton Abbey might
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satisfy, but that leave most workers in domestic service without federal coverage.
The first sign of hope came in the mid-1970s by way of an important change to
the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act – more about that in a moment –
and the past two decades have seen the emergence of three ambitious initiatives
that have had varying degrees of success and geographical dispersion: the
extension of federal and state wage-and-hour protection to workers who provide
companionship and/or live-in care for the elderly, the infirm, and the disabled;
the state-by-state enactment of a “Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers” designed
to protect the interests of care workers providing a wide variety of in-home
services; and the designation of in-home care workers whose compensation is
provided by public funding as “employees” of the state – or of a state-created
institutional proxy – for purposes of collective bargaining over wages and other
salient issues. The sections that follow offer a closer look at each of these
initiatives.
3.1. Wage and hour law: The companionship and live-in exemptions for elder and
other in-home care work

Since the New Deal, US wage and hour law has been governed in the first
instance by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which establishes a federally
mandated minimum hourly wage as well as a mandatory time-and-a-half overtime
premium for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Individual states may and
frequently do establish higher minimums and overtime premiums for employers
operating within their borders and also with some frequency extend state
coverage to workers excluded from the protection of the federal statute. 13
As mentioned earlier, domestic servants were by terms excluded from the
original text of the FLSA, but in 1974 Congress amended the statute to end that
exclusion and cover a wide swath of workers providing cooking, cleaning, child
care, and other household services. Statutory exemption was continued, however,

13
The current federal minimum wage – established in 2009 – is $7.25/hour, but 29 states as
well as the District of Columbia have established higher minima, the highest of which are the
District (at $10.50) and the states of California and Massachusetts (at $10.00). See United
States Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Minimum Wage Laws in the States –
Consolidated State Minimum Wage Update Table (Effective Date: 1 January 2016), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2016.]
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for “live-in” domestic servants as well as providers of “companionship” services
for the elderly, the infirm, and the disabled. In the language of the sponsors of the
1974 legislation, the latter exemption was designed for those who would keep
their charges company and ensure their basic safety and well-being even if those
services included “incidental” personal care and household work, such as
preparing an occasional meal or light washing and cleaning. To police the line
between exempt companions and the larger class of newly covered domestic
workers, the Department of Labor early on established a rule that eliminated the
companionship exemption for those whose performance of such “incidental
services” exceeded 20% of the weekly hours worked. 14
In a world in which most such care was provided by family – which is to say by
wives, daughters, and daughters-in-law – the companionship exemption no doubt
seemed like a sensible effort to avoid “making a federal case” out of relatively
minor gap-filling services offered by neighbors, fellow parishioners, and the
occasional “sitter.” But a series of developments during the final decades of the
twentieth century conspired to transform the nature and institutional dimensions
of elder and other in-home care in the US, including:
•
an aging population;
•
the increasing “medicalization” of elder care (from blood-pressure
monitoring to medication management to other paramedical tasks);
•
the decline in institutionalized forms of elder and other care in favor of
in-home services;
•
the decline of the family wage and the entry into the labor market of
large numbers of women who had previously provided elder and other
care in their so-called “spare time”;
•
the expansion of Medicaid funding for long-term home care services;
•
and (prompted in no small part by the availability of public funding)
the dramatic rise of third-party home care agencies, which today
employ nearly three-quarters of those providing elder and other care
services in the recipients’homes.
(Boris, Klein, 2015; Duffy, Armenia, Stacey, 2015.) Indeed, in-home health
care is the fastest growing occupational cohort in the US (Duffy, 2015).
Responding to these and related developments, 19 states and the District of
14
The history of this legislation is set forth in Home Care Association v. Weil, 799 F.3d
1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Columbia (D.C.) have adopted various forms of wage-and-hour coverage for
companionship and live-in service providers. For example, with minor variations,
California, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and D.C. extend minimum wage
protections to persons otherwise subject to the FLSA companionship exemption.
All but North Dakota and Ohio likewise extend overtime protections to such
workers, and all but Nevada and Washington eliminate the live-in exemption.
Again with minor variations, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin likewise provide wage-and-hour
protection to FLSA companions – and, except in Michigan, extend such
protection to live-in workers as well – but they limit coverage to those hired by
third-party agencies and retain the FLSA exemption for those companions hired
directly by families. 15
On the federal side, on January 1, 2016, the Department of Labor under
President Obama implemented regulations making important changes in the
interpretation and enforcement of the companionship and live-in exemptions:
•
First, the regulations sharply narrow the definition of “companionship
services” to “fellowship” and “protection,” which include activities
such as playing cards, visiting with friends and neighbors, and taking
walks, but do not include personal care services (such as bathing and
feeding), minor medical care, or general household services (meal
preparation, cleaning, and so on). Accordingly, if the latter efforts
constitute 20% or more of the individual’s weekly work, the
companionship exemption does not apply.
•
Second – and following the lead of a number of the aforementioned
states – the regulations limit both the companionship and live-in
exemptions to those engaged directly by the care beneficiary or her
family and deny it to home care workers employed by third-party
agencies. 16
Paywizard.org, (2016). Minimum Wage Provisions Home Care Aides – Federal and
per State. [online] Available at: http://www.paywizard.org/main/salary/minimum-wage/
home-care-aides; id., Overtime Pay Provisions Home Care Aides – Federal and per State.
[online] Available at: http://www.paywizard.org/main/salary/labor-law/overtime-pay/
home-care-aides
15

16

http://www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/faq.htm.
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Once again, the FLSA establishes the wage-and-hour “floor” beneath which
states may not go, and accordingly these new regulations can be expected to have
a sweeping effect on the 31 states that have not adopted legislation protecting
companionship and live-in service providers. 17
Turning to the question of enforcement, on the federal side there are public
and private avenues for relief against employers who violate minimum wage and
overtime provisions. The Wage and Hour Division of the US Department of
Labor has the authority to investigate violations – either on its own initiative or in
response to a complaint – and to secure a range of remedies from the restoration
of unpaid wages to civil and criminal penalties. 18 For willful and repeat offenders,
civil fines of up to $1,100 may be imposed for each violation; criminal prosecution
may result in fines of up to $10,000 and, for a second conviction, imprisonment. 19
Private rights vindication is also available in the form of individual lawsuits as
well as “collective actions” under by the FLSA. The statute also authorizes
recovery of unpaid wages as well as liquidated damages calculated at twice that
amount plus reasonable attorneys’fees, but punitive damages are unavailable.
Because the potential recovery for an individual low-wage worker is ordinarily too
meager to make litigation viable, the statute authorizes “collective actions” that
enable multiple claimants to aggregate their claims against an employer. These
actions differ from the traditional class action in at least one significant respect: a
class-action plaintiff’s representation of similarly situated claimants is presumed
unless and until they “opt out” of the proceeding, but, in order to benefit from an
FLSA collective action, an individual claimant must affirmatively “opt in” by
filing a consent-to-join forms with the court. (Ruan, 2012.)
Employers none too happy with “whistleblowers” – employees who initiate or
participate in proceedings alleging wage and hour violations – are nonetheless
prohibited from discharging or engaging in any other retaliation against them. A
variety of remedies are available when they do, including lost wages as well as
compensatory damages, equitable relief such as reinstatement, and reasonable
17
As this essay was going to press, an effort by third-party agency representatives to enjoin
enforcement of these new regulations was rejected in a carefully reasoned opinion issued by a
unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Home Care
Association v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
18
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs44.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2016.]
19
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/mwposter.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2016.]
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attorneys fees. 20 Although the question is not settled, there is also authority for an
award of punitive damages in FLSA retaliation cases. 21
At the state level, the specifics vary but most jurisdictions provide public as
well as private enforcement options that at least in broad outline track the federal
model. The most notable recent development on this front is the enactment of
“wage theft prevention acts” by well over a dozen states and D.C., virtually all of
which require employers to provide detailed and accurate pay rate information to
employees upon hire and over the course of their employment, with the dual
purpose of incentivizing employer compliance through transparency and at the
same time easing the evidentiary burden on employees who pursue claims. Other
common provisions include substantially increased penalties for wage and hour
violations, enhanced protections against whistleblower retaliation, and augmented
judicial powers (such as the freezing of assets) for securing compliance with
remedial orders. (Boris, Jokela, Undén, 2015; Dasse, 2014; Weisbard, Leonard,
2015.)
3.2. The “Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers” movement

The current decade has seen the enactment of a “Bill of Rights for Domestic
Workers” (BOR) in a half dozen states. The movement began with New York in
2010, 22 and it subsequently spread to Hawaii, 23 California, 24 Massachusetts, 25
Connecticut, 26 and Oregon; 27 as this went to press, a bill was under consideration

29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
See, e.g., Shea v. Galaxie Lumber, 152 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998).
22
New York Domestic Workers Law 2010, 13A N.Y. Prac., Employment Law in New
York § 7:263 (2d ed.) (2015).
23
Act 248, 2013 Session, §§ 1-2, amending Hawai’i Revised Statutes §§ 378-1 and 378-2,
available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2013/bills/GM1351_.PDF. [Accessed 24
January 2016.]
24
Cal. Lab. Code § 1450 et seq. (2014).
25
Massachusetts General Laws 149 §§ 190, 191 et seq. (2015).
26
An Act Concerning Service and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities,
2015 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 15-249 (S.B. 446) (WEST).
27
Employment Protections for Domestic Workers, Oregon Statutes, Ch. 457, § 1 (2015).
20
21
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in a seventh jurisdiction as well. 28 Who counts as a legally protected “domestic
worker” varies by state. Oregon’s law, for example, covers nannies, house
cleaners, and housekeepers in private homes but excludes home care workers,
who have collective bargaining rights as discussed in the next section of the essay.
Connecticut’s law, by contrast, covers home care workers as well as other
domestics, but its reach is limited to households with three or more employees.
The specific “rights” at issue likewise vary. Apart from Connecticut, each of
the states extends to domestic workers the protections of minimum wage and
overtime law. On the wage and hour front, Hawaii adds the right to be paid at
least twice a month, and Massachusetts adds a guarantee of two weeks’severance
pay in the event of termination without cause.
With the exception of California, each of the states provides protection against
sexual, racial, and other forms of harassment. Connecticut and Oregon add
protections against discrimination in hiring and firing, and Connecticut’s law
further provides a right to a reasonable leave of absence for a disability resulting
from a pregnancy. Hawaii’s original bill contained hiring discrimination
provisions as well, but – in what has become a familiar pattern in the US when
antidiscrimination efforts meet claims of religious freedom – the provisions were
reportedly scrapped after “religious groups in the state … expressed concern that
employers would not be allowed to fire people who work in their home but
espouse different religious views or attempt to indoctrinate children with their
religious views” (Bapat, 2013).
Other rights include a weekly “day of rest” (Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
York, and Oregon); the right to daily sleep, rest, and meal breaks (Massachusetts
and Oregon); a right to cook personal meals on the employer’s premises
(Oregon); and a right to privacy in connection with such personal activities as
making phone calls (Massachusetts).
In terms of enforcement, the principal effect of these statutes was to eliminate
the exclusion of domestic workers from existing wage and hour and
antidiscrimination laws, and thus domestic workers now have recourse to the
same mix of public and private remedial options enjoyed by employees in other
occupations. Hawaii offers a unique enforcement innovation through its Office of
28
Illinois Domestic Worker Bill of Rights 2013 (SB 1708), available at http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1708&GAID=12&DocTypeID=SB&SessionID=85&GA
=98. [Accessed 24 January 2016.]
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Community Services (OCS), established specifically for the purpose of assisting
“low-income, immigrant, and refugee populations to overcome and alleviate
workforce barriers to economic self-sufficiency through an array of communitybased programs and services.” 29 The OCS has contracted with non-profit
immigrant resource centers in four locations throughout the state to provide a
variety of services to the target populations, including assistance to domestic
workers in learning about the rights afforded them by the Hawaii BOR and in
availing themselves of its protection. 30
3.3. Bargaining in the shadow of the state

3.3.1. Collective representation for home care workers
Since the late 1990s, home care workers – who provide in-home services to the
elderly, the disabled, and the infirm through Medicaid funded state-run programs
– have secured the right to bargain collectively with public authorities in ten
states: California, 31 Connecticut, 32 Illinois, 33 Maryland, 34 Massachusetts, 35
Minnesota, 36 Missouri, 37 Oregon, 38 Vermont, 39 and Washington. 40 Home care
workers initially secured bargaining rights in several additional states but
subsequently lost those rights as a result of political developments discussed in
Part III of the essay. Yet this is a growing and sizeable workforce, and the
unionized cohort has been estimated at over 440,000 workers (Rhee, Zabin,
2009).
29

http://labor.hawaii.gov/ocs/.
http://labor.hawaii.gov/domestic-workers-rights/ .
31
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12301.6 (1999).
32
Conn. Gen Stats. §§ 17b-706 (2012).
33
Ill. Compiled Stats. § 2405/3 (2003).
34
Md. Code, Health—General §§ 15-901 to 15-907 (2011).
35
Mass. Gen. Laws 118E §§ 70-75 (2006).
36
Minn. Stats. § 179A.54 (2013).
37
Missouri Rev’d Stats. §§ 208.850-208.871 (2008).
38
Ore. Rev’d Statutes §§ 410.595-410.625 (2001).
39
21 Vt. Stats. §§ 1631-1644 (2013).
40
Wash. Rev’d Code § 74.39A.270 (2004).
30
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Early efforts to organize for purposes of bargaining with state program
administrators over wages and other benefits foundered on the objection that
home care workers were “really” the employees of the individual care recipients
and their families rather than of the state. (As it happens, that argument has
recently captured the fancy of a majority of US Supreme Court Justices, and more
on that too in Part III.) In the 1990s, the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) – collaborating with disability, consumer, and senior citizen organizations
– secured passage of legislation in California requiring the establishment of
county-level public authorities that would serve as “employers of record” for
home care workers providing services through California’s In-Home Support
Services program. (Boris, Klein, 2015.) Thus originated the idea of creating an
“employer” via state law that could engage in collective bargaining with a labor
organization representing individual providers, and versions of this model have
been successfully employed to enable collective bargaining by home care workers
in each of the states listed above. What follows is a description of the mechanics
of the model as well as the results of a decade and a half of collective bargaining
in the shadow of the state.
•
The path to bargaining rights: Bargaining rights for home care workers
were in each case the product of efforts by a union-led political
coalition that frequently included organizations representing care
beneficiaries and consumer groups, but the particular means used to
secure the requisite legal authority differed by jurisdiction. In Oregon,
Washington, and Missouri, the rights were established via public
referendum. In Illinois, Maryland, and Connecticut, bargaining rights
were initially secured by an executive order issued by the state’s
governor, and in each case the rights were subsequently codified by
statute. In the remaining states, bargaining rights were secured in the
first instance through the legislature.
•
The employer-side bargaining representative: Bargaining in California
continues to operate on a county-by-county basis, but every other
jurisdiction has established or designated a state-wide bargaining
entity. In some states, the entity is a commission created entirely for
this purpose (e.g., the “Home Care Commission” in Oregon and the
“Personal Care Attendant Quality Home Care Workforce Council” in
Massachusetts); in other states, the union representing home care
workers bargains directly with representatives of an existing state
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office (such as the governor in Washington and the departmental
program administrators in Maryland).
•
The employee-side bargaining representative: Following the approach
used in the US for both private and public sector collective bargaining,
elections are authorized in each state to determine whether a majority
of the home care workers desires union representation. In California,
the elections were conducted at the county level, and various SEIU,
AFSCME, and other union locals have won representative status in 55
of the state’s 58 counties. The other states required state-wide
elections, resulting in representative status for the SEIU in
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and
Washington; for AFSCME in Maryland and Vermont; and for a joint
SEIU/AFSCME local in Missouri.
The gains established in collective bargaining likewise vary by state, but a
number of discernible patterns have emerged. First and foremost, the contracts in
all ten jurisdictions establish wage rates that substantially exceed existing
minimum-wage levels. In the State of Washington, for example, under the current
collective contract, wages range from $11.50/hour at the entry-level to $15.65 for
workers with substantial experience and training. 41 Oregon has a starting wage of
$13.75; 42 and Massachusetts recently agreed to a $15/hour starting wage effective
in 2018. 43 Other benefits frequently contracted for are health insurance, including
dental and vision; 44 workers compensation coverage; 45 on-the-job health and
safety protection (such as state-provided masks, exam gloves, and hand sanitizer); 46 transportation benefits (including passes for public transportation and

Collective Bargaining Agreement: The State of Washington and Service Employees
International Union Healthcare 775NW, Effective July 1, 2015, Through June 30, 2017 (Washington
Agreement) at A-2, available at http://ofm.wa.gov/labor/agreements/15-17/nse_homecare.pdf.
42
2013-2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Home Care Commission and
Service Employees International Union, Local 503, OPEU (Oregon Agreement) at 19-20,
available at http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/CHRO/docs/lr/13_15_SEIU-HCC_final.pdf.
43
See http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/newsroom/press-releases/eohhs/baker-administration
-negotiates-new-contract-pca.html.
44
See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 18; Washington Agreement, 13-14.
45
See, e.g., Washington Agreement, 16.
46
See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 29-30.
41
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personal vehicle mileage allowances); 47 and paid time off. 48
Two additional features are worthy of particular note and may help account
for the frequent support for home health care worker bargaining rights among
advocacy organizations representing various cohorts of care beneficiaries. Thus,
common to virtually all of the agreements are provisions that establish training
support for home care workers, ranging from free-of-charge instruction in first
aid, CPR, safe-lifting, and nutrition; to reimbursement for tuition and books in
connection with job-relevant college coursework; to mandatory continuing
education programs for participation in which workers are paid at their contract
compensation rates. 49 Home care workers obviously benefit from the resulting
opportunity to develop and improve their skills, and care recipients benefit from
the promise of trained caregiving.
Several of the contracts also establish referral registries to assist home care
workers in finding placements and care beneficiaries in finding suitable
caregivers. The details vary, but the picture that emerges falls somewhere between
a traditional union hiring hall and Angie’s List. The Oregon registry, for example,
operates as an on-line data-base that can be freely accessed by “customers,” the
term typically used in these agreements for persons eligible for in-home care in
connection with a Medicaid-funded, state-run program. On the supply side, a
would-be caregiver is permitted to post her name, contact information, and
service profile on the registry so long as she has passed a criminal background
check and complied with certain orientation, training, and continuing education
requirements; profiles may be removed for misconduct, poor performance, or a
violation of pertinent regulations by the caregiver. A “customer” seeking a referral
simply enters the desired search criteria, and the registry generates a randomized
list of matching referrals. 50 Washington operates a registry with similar listing
eligibility and removal features, but a “customer” search generates a referral
based on seniority or, if the customer identifies special needs or preferences (e.g.,
facility with a particular language), referral of the most senior provider who meets

See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 24-25; Washington Agreement, 13.
See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 25-27; Washington Agreement, 16.
49
See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 31-33; Washington Agreement, 21-25.
50
See Oregon Agreement, 13-16.
47
48
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those needs and preferences. 51 For the home health care worker, then, the
registry offers a potentially valuable source of work; and, for the “customer,” the
registry provides reliable source of trained and qualified care-givers.
Two final features of the collective bargaining agreements, each of them
common in US labor relations, need mention as well. First, the agreements
invariably provide grievance procedures that permit the resolution of pay,
referral, and other disputes via a series of steps of increasing formality and
culminating in arbitration, appeal to a state employment relations tribunal, or
some other final dispute resolution mechanism. 52 Second, the agreements provide
a funding mechanism for the union’s representation activities. Historically, such
provisions have required payment of a “fair share” fee to the union via automatic
payroll deduction as a condition of continued employment. 53 The legal
enforceability of “fair share” agreements has, however, been called into question
by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn, which will be discussed
in Part III of the essay, and many bargaining agreements negotiated since that
decision have made payments to the union voluntary. 54
3.3.2.

Transplanting the model: Organizing family child care workers

Using the “state as employer” model, bargaining rights have likewise been
established for a second occupational cohort over the course of the past decade:
family child care workers who serve in state and federally funded programs
providing in-home “day care” services for children. Connecticut, 55 Illinois, 56
Maryland, 57 Massachusetts, 58 Minnesota, 59 New Jersey, 60 New Mexico, 61 New

See Washington Agreement, 18-20.
See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, 16-17; Washington Agreement, 10-12.
53
See, e.g., Oregon Agreement, at 5, 8.
54
See, e.g., Washington Agreement, at 6-7.
55
Conn. Gen Stat. Ann § 17b-705a (West 2013).
56
5 I.L.C.S. 315/7 (2014).
57
MD Code, Family Law, § 5-595.3 (2010).
58
Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 15D § 17 (West 2012).
59
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 179A.52 (West 2013).
60
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:5B-22.2(a) (West 2010).
61
N.M.S.A.1978, § 50-4-33 (2009).
51
52
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York, 62 Oregon, 63 Rhode Island, 64 Vermont, 65 and Washington 66 have all taken
this step, and over 200,000 of these workers are represented by unions (Rhee,
Zabin, 2009). Again as in the case of home care workers, bargaining rights for
family child care workers were initially established in several other states and have
since been withdrawn, a development to which I will return in Part III.
For present purposes, a detailed picture of the history and contours of
collective bargaining in family child care would be needlessly duplicative of the
home care work story, so I will focus here on a handful of key differences
between the two contexts. First, the individuals in this cohort work in their own
homes – or in the homes of other providers – rather than in the homes of the
families whose children they supervise. Moreover, they typically think of
themselves as self-employed, rather than as employed by others, and frequently
hire workers of their own. They are often former child care professionals who
have decided to go into business on their own because they desire more
workplace autonomy and/or because they need or wish to continue gainful
employment while staying at home with their own children. They pay dearly for
that choice, subjecting themselves to a variety of state licensing requirements (e.g.,
re supervision ratios and fire prevention measures) and netting on average
$7.14/hour with no benefits, which is less than the federal minimum wage of
$7.25/hour and considerably less than what they would make if they worked at a
child-care center. Indeed, in states and localities with a higher minimum wage,
they may earn substantially less per hour than their own employees. (Armenia,
2015.)
As with home care, collective bargaining has brought substantial gains to such
workers. To offer a few illustrations, in Illinois, the initial contract authorized an
immediate 10% increase in pay rates and an additional 28-to-34.5% increase over
the ensuing 39 months. Family child care workers in Oregon secured an 18% rate
increase as well as expanded state subsidies for child care, thus increasing the
demand for their services. In Washington, the state child care subsidy was

McKinney’s Labor Law § 695-b (2010).
O.R.S. § 329A.430 (2007).
64
R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-6.6 (West 2013).
65
33 V.S.A. § 3602 (2014).
66
West’s R.C.W.A. 41.56.028 (2007).
62
63
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increased by $45.5 million, and workers additionally secured $750,000 in job
training subsidies. (Rhee, Zabin, 2009.) The current Connecticut agreement
provides pay rate increases of 3-to-10% for each of the four years under contract
and $200,000 per year in professional development funds for training and jobrelevant coursework; it also establishes a working group to explore the feasibility
of offering subsidized health benefits to covered workers. 67
4. Evaluating the initiatives
4.1. Invisible no more

Given the exclusion of domestic workers from virtually the entire body of
workplace regulation developed in the twentieth century, the initiatives just
described are nothing short of extraordinary. The successes in securing wage and
hour, antidiscrimination, and other protections via legislative and regulatory
reform are particularly impressive, given the limited political power of low-wage
working women, most of them of color and/or of extra-national origin. The
collective-bargaining successes are likewise remarkable, given these demographic
vulnerabilities as well as the challenge of organizing and representing a workforce
without a common workplace. The material gains on both fronts – including
sizeable pay increases and a profusion of benefits – have been considerable.
Moreover, each of the collective-bargaining successes was enabled by an
earlier victory either in the state legislature, in the governor’s office, or through a
popular referendum authorizing the establishment of a bargaining relationship in
the first place. Taking the wage and hour, Bill of Rights, and collective bargaining
initiatives together, we are talking about political victories in 26 states – and, in
nearly half of those, of victories on multiple fronts. In an era of deep legislative
gridlock at the federal level – and at a time when the US labor movement is
supposed to be on the ropes – this is a truly impressive record of law reform
achievement. To be sure, there is a familiar pattern to the dispersion of these
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Connecticut Office of Early Childhood and
CSEA-SEIU Local 2001 (The Child Care Union), July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2017, Articles
Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen. Available at http://www.ctchildcare.org/files/2014/06/ChildCare-Contract.pdf.
67
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successes, for the 26 states are in the terminology of American political punditry
overwhelmingly “blue” or “purple,” with only a handful of “red” states in the
mix. Yet the recent successes of state minimum-wage initiatives in what are now
reliably “red” states – Alaska, Arkansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota – suggest
that the plight of the working poor may have more traction with the voting public
than it does with their elected representatives or other US political elites. 68
4.2. The considerable advantages of collective bargaining over statutory rights

Yet the difference between what has thus far been accomplished via statute
alone and what has been accomplished through collective bargaining is striking.
Important as they are, the gains made by extending minimum wage and overtime
protection to domestic workers are modest quite nearly to a fault. For example,
an individual with two dependents working a forty-hour week at the federal
minimum wage of $7.25/hour will still make less than the federal poverty
threshold for a year of work; indeed, even in the US jurisdiction with the highest
minimum (D.C. at $10.50), she would scarcely exceed that mark. 69 The
antidiscrimination coverage available to domestic workers – in the half-dozen
states that have enacted a Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers and thus provide
them with any antidiscrimination coverage at all – is for the most part limited to
protection from sexual, racial, and other forms of harassment. This laudable
achievement addresses one of the most insidious forms of exploitation in the
domestic work context, but in four of the six jurisdictions it regrettably does not
include the protection against discrimination in hiring and firing available to the
vast majority of other American workers. The additional gains secured by the Bill
of Rights movement – a mandatory “day of rest”; a right to work breaks; a right to
prepare and eat a meal over the course of the working day; and a right to make
unmonitored personal calls – are so basic to the material needs and dignitary
interests of working people that their denial, in the words of Supreme Court
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014 Minimum Wage Ballot Measures
(11/6/14), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/minimum-wageballot-measures.aspx.
69
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation, 2015 Poverty Guidelines (9/3/15), available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/2015poverty-guidelines#threshholds.
68
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Justice Hugo Black, would constitute working conditions “too bad to have to be
tolerated in a humane and civilized society like ours.” 70
By contrast, the achievements from collective bargaining are far more
substantial, typically including pay rates at half again to over twice the federal
minimum wage, health and safety benefits, transportation allowances, paid days
off, and substantial investments in job training. Moreover, in terms of enforcing
those rights – that is to say, when we look at the law in action as opposed to
what’s merely on the books – the bargaining model likewise offers considerable
advantages over the statutory alternatives.
Consider the challenges that abound in securing compliance with wage and
hour law for those previously excluded by the companionship and live-in
exemptions. On the public enforcement side, federal and state agencies are
woefully underfunded and understaffed, particularly in the wake of the 2007
Recession and resulting cuts in public sector spending. (Ruan, 2012; Rogers,
2011.) Even in the best of times, agencies will seldom proceed against any but the
most flagrant and inveterate violators, and the likelihood of an enforcement
proceeding against a particular third-party provider of home care services – let
alone an individual or a family in states where the law applies to them – is
vanishingly small.
As noted earlier, rights vindication via private lawsuit is available in the form
of individual claims as well as “collective actions” authorized by the FLSA. To be
sure, the statute authorizes recovery of unpaid wages as well as liquidated
damages and reasonable attorneys’fees. But given (1) the low wage rates
ultimately at stake, (2) the unavailability of punitive damages, and (3) the accessto-justice challenges faced by most low-wage workers, individual suits are seldom
economically viable. Collective actions are a more promising vehicle but depend
on the presence of target employers large enough to make claim aggregation pay,
and many home care workers are employed by small third-party firms or
individuals and families. Even in the context of larger firms, there are significant
procedural hurdles. For one thing, recent Supreme Court decisions have upheld
employment contracts that require legal claims to be submitted to binding
arbitration, as well as contract provisions banning class claims in the arbitral
context. Moreover, the requirement that FLSA claimants “opt in” to collective
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actions – and the resulting need to track down and persuade potential claimants
to take this step – may substantially increase litigation costs as well as the
incentives for resistance, since by opting in a claimant will make his active support
for the lawsuit known to the employer and thus increase the high and very real
risk of retaliation. (Ruan, 2012; Boris, Jokela, Undén, 2015.)
As a result of such impediments to enforcement, documented noncompliance
with wage and hour law is so common in the US that it even has a name: “wage
theft” (Rogers 2011). Indeed, survey data in New York suggests that a majority of
domestic workers were not getting the overtime pay required by that state’s Bill of
Rights fully two years after enactment (Lerner, 2012). Because the workplace of
the domestic worker is a private home – rather than a factory or an office – the
challenge of locating workers and informing them of their rights is a daunting one
and frequently made more difficult by language and cultural barriers (Semple,
2011). Surveillance and spot-check techniques that are potentially viable in
traditional workplace settings would predictably prompt vigorous political
opposition and might raise privacy issues of a constitutional dimension in the
home care setting.
Union representation, on the other hand, is perhaps the most effective means
of overcoming the enforcement problems that plague the wage-and-hour and Bill
of Rights approaches. Representation does not stop when the ink is dry on a
collective agreement but instead continues through the contract term, providing
workers with an institutional mechanism (a) for keeping them apprised of their
rights; (b) for policing and correcting individual contract violations through both
informal and formal grievance procedures; and (c) for identifying patterns of
difficulty that can be raised in the next round of bargaining or via other collective
action. In the care work context, the “registry” device may offer a promising
approach to quick and low-key dispute resolution by offering the prospect of a
new placement – rather than unemployment together with a long and costly
lawsuit – when an existing care arrangement founders on the rocks of personality
clashes or conflicting expectations.
The benefits that have attended collective bargaining for home care workers
are typical of those available to employees in the US who are represented by
unions, but unions – and successful unionization efforts – are increasingly rare in
the contemporary US economy, so it’s fair to ask how the successes here were
achieved by what might seem like a most unlikely cohort of workers. One answer
is that low-wage service work has in general been the bright spot in the otherwise
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fairly bleak story of the contemporary labor movement. The Justice for Janitors
campaigns of the 1990s as well as more recent campaigns to organize hospitality
workers, food and security service employees, poultry processing employees, car
wash attendants, and home care workers have met with many surprising “against
the odds” successes. An important reason for this is that such service work
cannot, at least as yet, be shipped elsewhere – let alone overseas – and accordingly
employers cannot deploy nor plausibly threaten to deploy what is ordinarily the
most powerful weapon they have to resist unionization. Care work is likewise,
again so far, relatively immune to the second best weapon in the employer unionresistance arsenal – i.e., mechanization. Finally, turning to the organizing
strategies deployed in the campaigns described here, efforts to develop solidarities
with the recipients of care – by focusing on the benefits to all concerned of such
features as enhanced job training and worker-beneficiary matching mechanisms –
have often if by no means invariably proven successful in removing what would
otherwise be the most powerful source of potential opposition to bargaining
rights for home care workers (Boris, Klein, 2015).
4.3. Second thoughts
4.3.1.

The promise of statutory rights

That is where this project, as I had originally conceived it, would have ended:
as further evidence, if further evidence were needed, of the superiority of
collective bargaining and representation in comparison with enacting and
enforcing statutory rights as a vehicle for improving the lives of a widely dispersed
and particularly vulnerable cohort of low-wage workers. But in the process of
immersing myself in this large and growing body of law and literature, I have
come to a more nuanced view, at once more concerned about the prospects on
the ground for collective bargaining and at the same time a bit more sanguine in
my assessment of the benefits of statutory reform.
On the latter front, I begin with the observation that it is obviously far too
early to tell what the wage-and-hour and Bill of Rights initiatives will accomplish,
since the first Bill of Rights for Domestic Workers was enacted in 2010, and since,
for most US home care workers, the expansion of wage-and-hour coverage came
into effect on January 1, 2016. Moreover, though it is an all-too-common rookie
error among legal scholars to ignore the enforcement dimension of law reform
proposals and developments – in the familiar taunts of the playground bully who
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is asked to desist, “Who’s going to make me?” and “You and whose army?” –
there is a corresponding occupational hazard in blithely assuming that law has no
effect unless and until the army shows up at the door. Thus, many individual and
corporate employers of home care and other domestic workers may be expected
to comply with the terms of these laws once they learn of them, and the publiceducation dimension of the campaigns to enact them may well have brought at
least the existence of the new standards and perhaps the need for them as well to
fairly widespread attention. Indeed, conformity may be greatest among the
growing cohort of large third-party firms in the home care industry, since they
frequently tout their law-compliance services as a major benefit to would-be
consumers and simply pass along the costs. At the same time, individual states are
experimenting with promising mechanisms to increase worker awareness of their
rights and to better enable them to enforce them, from the Wage Theft
Prevention Statutes already enacted in over a dozen states to Hawaii’s effort to
provide such assistance to domestic servants via state-contracted non-profit
immigration resource centers.
The struggles for enactment and enforcement of statutory rights can likewise
achieve additional salutary ends in the larger effort – now the subject of its own
ILO convention – to make domestic service “decent work” (Blackett 2011). For
one thing, worker centers and grass-roots advocacy organizations (most
prominently, the National Domestic Workers’Alliance) have been a source of
robust community building among care workers as well as a powerful engine for
law reform and enforcement (Boris, Jokela, Undén, 2015; Boris and Klein, 2015;
Little, 2015). For another, contemporary unions have increasingly touted their
capacity to secure enforcement of existing statutory rights as an organizing
strategy among low-wage workers (Fischl, 2007). And for yet another, as
demonstrated in the late Phyllis Palmer’s pathbreaking exploration of the role of
the civil rights and women’s liberation movements in post-World War II efforts
to gain Fair Labor Standards Act inclusion for domestic and agricultural workers,
“the most important weapon of the weak is their struggle with the powerful over
meaning and symbols” (Palmer, 1995, p. 417), and the contest over cultural
meaning – of understanding caregiving as work and of viewing the claims to
dignity and justice by care workers as every bit as worthy as the claims to dignity
and justice by those for whom they care – has been energetically engaged in each
of the law reform efforts described above.
Finally, it may well be that the greatest virtue of these rights-based initiatives is

52

Richard Michael Fischl

their staying power; once in place, legally recognized rights seem to be difficult to
revoke, a feature that distinguishes them from the collective bargaining initiatives,
and more on that in a moment.
4.3.2.

The limits and perils of bargaining with the state

Despite the remarkable gains achieved by collective bargaining for home care
and family child care workers, the promise of this model outside those contexts
may be limited, for most of the work provided by others in domestic service –
from nannies and elder-care nurses to cooks and housekeepers – is privately
funded. To be sure, the strategy of finding common cause with service
beneficiaries on issues such as worker training and reliable placements might offer
some possibilities for transplanting the “referral registry” mechanism to the
private sector setting. An experiment in Oregon – which has recently opened its
on-line home care referral registry to privately paying consumers – offers
intriguing possibilities (Boris, Jokela and Undén, 2015), and the resulting
transparency in the labor market for home care may well provide an avenue for
“nudging” compliance with wage and hour and other workplace regulations. But
unlike settings in which the state is paying the tab – thus substantially enhancing
the prospect of workers and beneficiaries finding common ground on non-wage
issues – the beneficiaries of privately funded domestic service are paying out of
pocket, and the antagonism of interests with respect to the basic wage bargain
may in the end crowd out points of potential mutual interest.
Even when it is available, collective bargaining “in the shadow of the state” has
considerable vulnerabilities, as recent political developments have made all too
clear. Except in the handful of states that adopted it via popular referendum, the
model depends for its very existence on enabling legislation or executive order,
and either can be amended or repealed by a subsequent less worker– and unionfriendly legislature or governor. This is precisely what happened in Wisconsin in
2011, when a newly elected Republican governor and legislative majority
eliminated pre-existing collective bargaining rights altogether for home health
care as well as family child care workers as part of a now infamous package of
anti-union initiatives (Fischl, 2011). It happened again last year in Ohio, when a
Republican governor rescinded executive orders promulgated by his Democratic
predecessor establishing collective bargaining rights for the home health care and
family child care workers in that state (Pelzer, 2015). It has happened as well in
Kansas, Maine, and Michigan, and there are ominous signs in Illinois, in each case
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the result of a change in party control of the governor’s office and/or the state
legislature. 71 This is, as we used to say, not a coincidence. It is of a piece with
Republican efforts at the state level to eliminate public sector collective
bargaining altogether, and to defund private sector unions via the enactment of
“right to work” laws, and these state level efforts may well represent the greatest
threat to collective bargaining in the US today. The relative immunity of
referendum-based collective bargaining from such reversals of fortune – together
with the recent success of minimum wage referenda revealing popular traction for
the cause of low-wage workers in even the “reddest” of states – suggest that this
may be an important vehicle for future efforts to secure decent work for care
workers.
In the meantime, there is yet another threat to the collective bargaining model,
this one coming from the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in
Harris v. Quinn 72 addressed a challenge to the “fair share” provision in a
collective-bargaining agreement covering home care workers in Illinois,
denominated “personal assistants” (PAs) in the pertinent state statute. In a
nutshell, the Court concluded that individual PAs enjoy a First Amendment
“freedom of association” right to refuse to pay for the benefits they receive from
union representation. The Court distinguished an earlier decision – Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education 73– which had rejected such a challenge in a case
involving public (i.e., government) employees, concluding that the PAs in Harris
were actually the employees of the individual beneficiaries of state-funded care
and only “partial” or “quasi” but not “full-fledged” public employees. 74
Subsequent developments suggest that Abood may not long be good law for even
the fully fledged, 75 and, at least in the public sector, this augurs poorly for the
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54

Richard Michael Fischl

continued viability of the principal means US unions have long employed to fund
their representation and bargaining activities.
The Court’s assertion that the PAs were “really” the employees of the elderly,
disabled, and infirm persons whom they serve through the State’s home care
rehabilitation program – the “customers,” in the language of the pertinent statute
– is worth a closer look, for it reveals judicial thinking still very much in the thrall
of nineteenth-century understandings of the employment relation and thus brings
us full circle to the legal history of domestic service with which the essay began.
Thus, a majority of justices focused on the incidents of absolute authority over the
PAs possessed by the customer, including the final say in deciding whether to
engage a particular PA, whether and when to terminate the relationship, and how
the services should proceed in the interim – in other words, the power to hire,
fire, and direct the course of work. 76
Responding that the customers and the State were better understood as “joint
employers” of the PAs, and the PAs thus full-fledged public employees under
Abood, the dissent described at some length the robust role played by the State
with respect to each of these incidents of employer power:
Illinois sets all the workforce-wide terms of employment. Most notably, the State
determines and pays the employees’wages and benefits, including health insurance
(while also withholding taxes). By regulation, Illinois establishes the job’s basic
qualifications: for example, the assistant must provide references or recommendations
and have adequate experience and training for the services given. So too, the State
describes the services any personal assistant may provide, and prescribes the terms of
standard employment contracts entered into between personal assistants and
customers. Illinois as well structures the individual relationship between the customer
and his assistant … Along with both the customer and his physician, a state-employed
counselor develops a service plan laying out the assistant’s specific job responsibilities,
hours, and working conditions. That counselor also assists the customer in conducting
a state-mandated annual performance review, based on state-established criteria, and
mediates any resulting disagreements. . .
Before a customer may hire an assistant, the counselor must sign off on the
employee’s ability to follow the customer’s directions and communicate with him. And
although only a customer can actually fire an assistant, the State can effectively do so
76
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by … withhold[ing] payment from an assistant (or altogether disqualify[ing] her from
the program) based on credible allegations of customer abuse, neglect, or financial
exploitation. 77

It is a not uncommon experience in reading US judicial opinions to find
oneself tempted to conclude that the majority and the dissent are talking about
two entirely different cases, but in Harris the differing perspectives reveal much
about the majority’s understanding of the employment relation. Consider the
state-employed counselor, who in the dissent’s recounting plays a significant role
in hiring and assessing the qualifications of a PA, in the development of a “service
plan” that specifies the responsibilities, hours, and working conditions of the PA,
and in the mandatory annual evaluation of a PA’s work. Yet the counselor’s
existence does not even merit mention in the majority opinion until the final
sentence of the five-paragraph passage devoted to its description of the
PA/customer relationship. 78 Instead, the customer seems to be alone at the wheel
because of the right to have a final say at the critical moments, and it is certainly
true that a PA will not be hired, a “service plan” will not go into effect, and a
disfavored PA will not be retained in a placement unless the customer agrees.
Thus, in the majority’s view, the customer is the employer because real employers
possess such absolute authority over their charges. By contrast, the State’s role in
the relationship is dialogic and one of shared governance; it merely “assists,”
“suggests,” “helps,” and “mediates” the customer’s decision-making via the
Counselor Who Must Not Be Named, and pay no attention to the man behind
the curtain who established the home care program, defined its parameters, and is
footing the bill. Speaking of footing the bill, this authoritarian understanding of
the employment relation would also go a long way to account for the otherwise
inexplicable erasure in the majority opinion of the health insurance benefits
enjoyed by the PAs. Those benefits were the product of collective bargaining with
the PAs’union rather than of the legislation providing such benefits to the rest of
the State’s workforce – that is, the product of shared governance rather than
sovereign command – and thus they just did not count in the majority’s
assessment of the State’s putative status as an employer.
The State is not the only party given short shrift in the majority’s framing of
77
78
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the case. The entire legal structure of home care provision in Illinois, and in the
other states that have adopted the “bargaining in the shadow of the state” model,
is the product of over a quarter century of struggles by and between home care
workers, unions, and worker centers seeking to make home care decent work;
disabled and aged persons and the advocacy organizations that represent them
seeking to enhance the availability and quality of care; and public officials
pursuing a mix of cost-containment and constituent service goals. As the Harris
dissent put it:
Workforce shortages and high turnover have long plagued in-home care programs,
principally because of low wages and benefits. That labor instability lessens the quality
of care, which in turn, forces disabled persons into institutions and (massively)
increases costs to the State. The individual customers are powerless to address those
systemic issues; rather, the State—because of its control over workforce-wide terms of
employment—is the single employer that can do so. And here Illinois determined (as
have nine other States) that negotiations with an exclusive representative offered the
best chance to set the Rehabilitation Program on firmer footing. Because of that
bargaining, … home-care assistants have nearly doubled their wages in less than 10
years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefited from better training and
workplace safety measures. The State, in return, has obtained guarantees against
strikes or other work stoppages—and most important, believes it has gotten a more
stable workforce providing higher quality care, thereby avoiding the costs associated
with institutionalization. 79

Yet even this account leaves out an important dimension of how the
collective bargaining model developed. The designation of the recipients of
home care as “customers” with considerable control over PAs and their work
had its genesis in California – the state that originated this model – and grew
out of the efforts of the “independent living” movement among disabled
persons seeking to wrest control from medical professionals who too often
treated them as patients to be managed rather than as self-actualizing
individuals who “best understood their [own] needs and how to meet them.”
Independent living centers ultimately played a crucial role in the effort to
persuade the California legislature to extend collective bargaining rights to
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home care workers by creating county-level public authorities with whom they
could bargain, agreeing that this would promote higher quality care but
insisting as part of the package that the beneficiaries of care “would retain
consumer control over the authorities and retain the right to hire, fire, and
direct their attendants.” (Boris, Klein, 2015, p. 102, 196.)
The legislation that emerged – and has served as a basic template for one of
the most promising innovations in modern labor law – thus empowered home
care workers by giving them a seat at the bargaining table and the individuals with
whom they work by giving due regard to their considerable interest in controlling
the delivery of their own care. As Harris confirms, jurists who still view the
employment relation through nineteenth-century lenses are likely to mistake the
latter for simply another instance of master-meets-obedient-servant and to have
no idea at all of what to make of the former.
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Appendix I: State-By-State Treatment of Domestic Servants and
Agricultural Laborers Under Workers Compensation Laws*

Citation

Exclusion for
Domestic
Servants

Pertinent
Provision

Exclusion
Type 1

Exclusion
for Agricultural
Laborers 2

25.06.
1910

1910 N.Y.
Laws 1945

Yes

§ 215

Negative
Implication 3

Yes

Kansas

14.03.
1911

1911 Kan.
Sess. Laws
382

Yes

§6

Negative
Implication

Yes

Washington

14.03.
1911

1911 W.V.
Acts 345

Yes

§2

Negative
Implication

Yes

Nevada

24.03.
1911

1911 Nev.
Stat. 362

Yes

§3

Negative
Implication

Yes

New Jersey

04.04.
1911

1911 N.J.
Laws 134

No

California

08.04.
1911

1911 Cal.
Stat. 796

Yes

§ 6(2)

Negative
Implication

Yes

New
Hampshire

15.04.
1911

1911 N.H.
Laws 181

Yes

§1

Negative
Implication

Yes

State

Date
of
Enact
ment

New York

No

* The author gratefully acknowledges the extensive assistance of Anne Rajotte,
Research Librarian at the University of Connecticut School of Law, in developing this
Appendix.
1
“Express” means the statute provided for broad coverage and imposed an “express”
(i.e., specific) exclusion for domestic servants. “Negative Implication” means the statute
covered only specified groups of workers (most commonly, those in a listed series of
“inherently dangerous jobs”) that did not include domestic servants.
2
Except in the cases of Vermont and Delaware – where the WC statutes contained
express exclusions for domestic servants but no exclusion for agricultural workers – every
other state treated agricultural workers in the same manner as domestic servants (i.e.,
express exclusion; exclusion by negative implication; or no exclusion at all).
3
In 1913, New York passed an amended version of the statute, which provided for
broad coverage but specifically excluded domestic servants and agricultural workers. 1913
N.Y. Laws 2277, § 3(4).
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Wisconsin

03.05.
1911

1911 Wis.
Sess. Laws
43

Yes

§ 23947(2)

Negative
Implication

Yes

Illinois

26.05.
1911

1911 Ill.
Laws 330

Yes

§1

Negative
Implication

Yes

Ohio

15.06.
1911

1911 Ohio
Laws 524

Small
Employ
er 4

§ 20-1

Massachusetts

28.07.
1911

1911 Mass.
Acts 998

Yes

Pt. I, § 2

Express

Yes

Michigan

20.03.
1912

1912 Mich.
Pub. Acts
20

Yes

Pt. I, § 2

Express

Yes

Maryland

15.04.
1912

1912 Md.
Laws 1624

No

Rhode Island

29.04.
1912

1912 R.I.
Acts &
Resolves
204

Yes

Art. I, §
2

Express

Yes

Arizona

24.05.
1912

1912 Ariz.
Sess. Laws
491

Yes

§4

Negative
Implication

Yes

Oregon

25.02.
1913

1913 Or.
Laws 188

Yes

§ 10

Negative
Implication

Yes

Texas

16.04.
1913

1913 Tex.
Gen. Laws
426

Yes

Pt. I, § 2

Express

Yes

Iowa

18.04.
1913

1913 Iowa
Acts 154

No

Nebraska

21.04.
1913

1913 Neb.
Laws 578

Yes

Small
Employer 4

No

No
Pt. I, §
6(2)

Express

Yes

Ohio and Connecticut limited the coverage of their statutes to employers with five or
more employees, thus excluding domestic servants, agricultural workers, and everyone else
working for smaller employers.
4

63

Serving in the Master’s House

Minnesota

24.04.
1913

1913 Minn.
Laws 675

Yes

Pt. 2, §
8

Connecticut

29.05.
1913

1913 Conn.
Pub. Acts
1735

Small
Employ
er 4

Pt. A, §
2

West Virginia

01.10.
1913

1913 W.Va.
Acts 64

Yes

§9

Express

Yes

Kentucky

21.03.
1914

1914 Ky.
Acts 226

Yes

§ 14

Express

Yes

Louisiana

18.06.
1914

1914 La.
Acts 44

Yes

§2

Negative
Implication

Yes

Wyoming

27.02.
1915

1915 Wyo.
Sess. Laws
172

Yes

§4

Negative
Implication

Yes

Indiana

08.03.
1915

1915 Ind.
Acts 392

Yes

Pt. I, § 9

Express

Yes

Montana

08.03.
1915

1915 Mont.
Laws 168

Yes

Pt. I, §
3(b)

Express

Yes

Oklahoma

22.03.
1915

1915 Okla.
Sess. Laws
471

Yes

§2

Negative
Implication

Yes

Maine

01.04.
1915

1915 Me.
Laws 265

Yes

§ 1(II)

Express

Yes

Vermont

01.04.
1915

1915 Vt.
Acts &
Resolves 275

Yes

Pt. II, §
4

Express

No

Colorado

10.04.
1915

1915 Colo.
Sess. Laws
515

Yes

§
4(d)(III)

Express

Yes

Pennsylvania

02.06.
1915

1915 Pa.
Laws 736

No

South Dakota

10.03.
1917

1917 S.D.
Sess. Laws ch.
375, p. 832

Yes

Express

Yes
Small
Employer 4

No
Pt. 1, §
8

Express

Yes
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New Mexico

13.03.
1917

1917 N.M.
Laws 209

Yes

§ 10

Negative
Implication

Yes

Utah

15.03.
1917

1917 Utah
Laws 306

Yes

§ 50(2)

Express

Yes

Idaho

16.03.
1917

1917 Idaho
Sess. Laws
252

Yes

Pt. I, §
3(b)

Express

Yes

Delaware

02.04.
1917

1 Del. Laws
763 (1917)

Yes

§ 141

Express

No

Virginia

21.03.
1918

1918 Va.
Acts 637

Yes

§ 15

Express

Yes

North Dakota

05.03.
1919

1919 N.D.
Laws 258

Yes

§2

Express

Yes

Tennessee

15.04.
1919

1919 Tenn.
Pub. Acts
369

Yes

§ 6(c)

Express

Yes

Missouri

28.04.
1919

1919 Mo.
Laws 456

Yes

§5

Express

Yes

Alabama

23.08.
1919

1919 Ala.
Laws 206

Yes

Pt. 2, §
8

Express

Yes

Georgia

17.08.
1920

1920 Ga.
Laws 167

Yes

§ 15

Express

Yes

North
Carolina

11.03.
1929

1920 N.C.
Sess. Laws
117

Yes

§ 2(a)

Express

Yes

Florida

10.06.
1935

1935 Fla.
Laws 1457

Yes

§ 2(1)

Express

Yes

South
Carolina

17.07.
1935

1935 S.C.
Acts 1231

Yes

§ 2(a)

Express

Yes

Arkansas

15.03.
1939

1939 Ark.
Acts 777

Yes

§ 2(c)

Express

Yes

Mississippi

13.04.
1948

1948 Miss.
Laws 507

Yes

§ 3(1)

Express

Yes
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Appendix II: Unemployment Insurance Statutes Enacted before
Enactment of Social Security Act of 1935 (8/14/35)

Citation

Exclusion for
Domestic
Servants

Pertinent
Provision

Exclusion for
Agricultural
Laborers (see
note 2)

Pertinent
Provision

Wisconsin

28.01.
1932

1932
Wisc.
Sess.
Laws 57

Yes

§
108.02(2)

Yes

§
108.02(1)

Utah

14.03.
1935

1935
Utah
Laws 43

No

Yes

§ 3(a)

Washington

21.03.
1935

1935
Wash.
Sess.
Laws
438

No

No

New York

25.04.
1935

1935
N.Y.
Laws
1028

No

Yes

§ 502(1)

New
Hampshire

29.05.
1935

1935
N.H.
Laws
154

Yes

§ 1(VI)(b)

Yes

§ 1(VI)(a)

California

25.06.
1935

1935
Cal.
Stat.
1226

Yes

Art. 2, §
7(b)

Yes

Art. 2, §
7(a)

Massachusetts

12.08.
1935

1935
Mass.
Acts
633

Yes

§5

Yes

§5

State

Date
of
Enact
ment
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